Growing controversy surrounds the impact of labor unions on law enforcement behavior. Critics allege that unions impede organizational reform and insulate officers from discipline for misconduct. The only evidence of these effects, however, is anecdotal. We exploit a quasiexperiment in Florida to estimate the effects of collective bargaining rights on law enforcement misconduct and other outcomes of public concern. In 2003, the Florida Supreme Court's Williams decision extended to county deputy sheriffs collective bargaining rights that municipal police officers had possessed for decades. We construct a comprehensive panel dataset of Florida law enforcement agencies starting in 1997, and employ a difference-in-difference approach that compares sheriffs' offices and police departments before and after Williams. Our primary result is that collective bargaining rights lead to about a 27% increase in complaints of officer misconduct for the typical sheriff's office. This result is robust to the inclusion of a variety of controls. The time pattern of the estimated effect, along with an analysis using agency-specific trends, suggests that it is not attributable to preexisting trends. The estimated effect of Williams is not robustly significant for other potential outcomes of interest, however, including the racial and gender composition of agencies and training and educational requirements.
investigation and discipline. At the same time, it is possible that unionization may reduce misconduct by providing a sense of empowerment and increased job satisfaction. To the extent that collective bargaining improves wages and benefits, the opportunity cost of misconduct may increase.
1 Thus, the impact of collective bargaining rights on law enforcement misconduct is ultimately an empirical question.
There has been significant scholarly attention recently to the issue of excessive law enforcement violence (Fryer 2016; Legewie and Fagan 2016; Shjarback 2015; Shane, Lawton, and Swenson 2017; Stickle 2016) , some of which has trained on the role of collective bargaining (Huq and McAdams 2016; Rushin 2017) . No previous work, however, has offered empirical evidence of the causal role that unionization or collective bargaining play in the performance of law enforcement. We offer such evidence by exploiting a January 2003 change in Florida labor law.
By a judicial decision that month (Williams), county sheriffs' deputies won for the first time the right to organize for collective bargaining. Before and after that date, municipal police officers had the right to engage in collective bargaining. We examine how Williams affected complaints of misconduct against law enforcement personnel at these two types of agencies.
Our analysis uses a dataset on Florida law enforcement agencies -covering both county sheriffs' offices (SOs) and city police departments (PDs) -that begins in 1997 (our primary tests use data for [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] . This dataset combines annual Criminal Justice Agency Profile (CJAP) surveys conducted by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) with administrative data from the FDLE on law enforcement officers and on complaints and disciplinary actions against officers. We analyze in particular the number of complaints at the agency-year level against officers affiliated with each agency. Our empirical strategy involves the use of a difference-indifference framework, in which the treatment group consists of SOs (that were affected by Williams) and the control group consists of PDs (that were unaffected). Officers assigned to agencies in the treatment and control groups perform similar job functions (Pynes and Corley 2006, 1 This is analogous to the idea that higher compensation can deter malfeasance among law enforcers (Becker and Stigler 1974) . There is also some evidence that police performance is affected by changes in wages relative to a reference point. Mas (2006) finds that police performance in New Jersey (as measured primarily by arrest rates) declines when police unions lose in wage arbitration. Mas (2006) does not analyze police misconduct, however. Unionization may also foster collective solidarity among police and interact with officers' intrinsic motivation. Dharmapala, Garoupa, and McAdams (2016) develop a theoretical model of intrinsic motivation among law enforcement agents but do not address the impact of unionization.
p. 299). 2 Likewise, similar pools of applicants seek employment with SOs and PDs, and there is lateral movement by officers between the agency types (Baker 2017a) .
We begin by showing that Williams led to substantial unionization among SOs. This occurred over a three-year period following the decision, and then stabilized; thus, our primary specifications use a three-year lag of the variable of interest (an interaction between the post-2003 years and an indicator for SOs). Our baseline analysis uses a Poisson maximum-likelihood model in order to accommodate count data on complaints. We control for agency and year fixed effects and for an extensive set of controls (including demographic variables, local economic conditions, and local crime rates). The central result is that collective bargaining rights led to about a 27% increase in complaints of officer misconduct for a typical SO. We also find some evidence that, for agency-years with positive numbers of complaints, the number of state disciplinary actions against officers also increased. We argue in Section 5 below that this suggests that the increased complaints against SOs were not accompanied by a decrease in the seriousness of these complaints.
When adding an extensive set of leads and lags to the basic model, we find that the difference-in-difference estimate is small and statistically insignificant for "false experiments" (or placebo tests) in years prior to 2003, suggesting that the results are not attributable to a preexisting trend toward more complaints against SOs. In a linear framework, the result is robust to adding linear agency-specific time trends and county-by-year fixed effects. Taken together, the results on prior years and on agency-specific time trends suggest that the parallel trend assumption that is crucial in the difference-in-difference framework is satisfied here. This supports a causal interpretation of our findings on the impact of collective bargaining rights, despite numerous factors we describe below that create a bias against our results.
Complaints are of course an imperfect measure of underlying misconduct. They are potentially affected by the strength of internal mechanisms for detection and by the propensity of civilians to report misconduct, as well as by the level of misconduct. All of the complaints in the FDLE's database meet a specified threshold of seriousness, however. Most, moreover, were already sustained by a local agency's internal investigation and then reported, as required by law, to the FDLE. Thus, our complaints measure is better viewed as consisting substantially of adjudicated instances of misconduct. The FDLE also has access to independent sources of information (beyond the reports of local agencies), allaying concerns about biases in local agencies' internal investigation processes. These factors mitigate the concerns about using complaints as a proxy for misconduct.
We also examine a number of other outcome variables that are potentially of interest in ongoing scholarly and public debates about policing. For instance, we explore how collective bargaining affected the racial and gender composition of law enforcement agencies, which may be one mechanism by which such bargaining affects police behavior and citizen complaints. The estimates suggest a decline in the racial diversity of law enforcement personnel, but this is not robustly significant across specifications. The estimated effect on gender diversity is small and statistically insignificant. We also find some evidence for increases in training and education requirements, but these results too are not robustly significant across specifications.
Our paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3 describes the relevant legal developments relating to collective bargaining rights under Florida law. Section 4 describes the dataset and our empirical strategy. Section 5 discusses the results, while Section 6 concludes.
2) Literature Review
Most prior studies on the effects of collective bargaining by law enforcement officers examine the relationship between the bargaining environment and officer remuneration.
Unionization is consistently and positively associated with officer wages and benefits (Briggs et al. 2008; Delaney and Feuille 1985; Doerner and Doerner 2010; Feuille and Delaney 1986; Feuille, Hendricks, and Delaney 1983; Freeman and Valletta 1988; Trejo 1991; Wilson et al. 2006; Zhao and Lovrich 1997) . Interestingly, this relationship holds even in states that forbid collective bargaining, where many officers still join unions (Freeman and Han 2013) . Likewise, strong labor laws are associated with higher wages even for nonunionized officers (Freeman and Valletta 1988; Ichniowski, Freeman, and Lauer 1989) .
The existing literature has mostly exploited either variation in the timing of state laws relating to public sector unions or variation in the timing of agencies' unionization. A recent example of the former is Frandsen (2014), which uses state-level panel data to determine that collective bargaining rights increased wages and shortened the workweek for law enforcement officers (for an earlier example, see Ichniowski, Freeman, and Lauer 1989) . A recent example of the latter approach is Anzia and Moe (2014), which uses city-level panel data and finds that unionization has had a strong positive effect on police departments' wages, employment levels, and payroll expenditures. Anzia and Moe (2014) also find that, relative to nonunionized agencies, unionized agencies spend more on salaries and health benefits, but have lower levels of employment.
To draw causal inferences, the former approach assumes that state legislation is exogenous with respect to the outcomes of interest, while the latter approach assumes that agencies' unionization decisions are exogenous. Our approach uses quasi-experimental variation in collective bargaining rights across agencies in the same state, and so does not require either of these assumptions. In addition, the past literature on the effects of labor laws on nonunionized workers -and the related idea of bargaining in the shadow of collective bargaining rights (whether or not an agency is actually unionized) -motivate our focus on collective bargaining rights, as distinct from collective bargaining agreements.
Most pertinent to our study, many scholars, drawing heavily on case studies, argue that law enforcement unions impede progressive policy reform and innovation (Bies 2017; Epp 2009; Fisk and Richardson 2016; McCormick 2015; Walker 2008) . The small empirical literature on this question is mixed, however. Some studies find that unionization is negatively associated with the adoption of particular reforms (Nowacki and Willits 2016) or modern accountability mechanisms more generally (Epp 2009 ). Perhaps related, Magenau and Hunt (1996) find that unionized agencies place significantly more emphasis on their "law enforcement" function relative to order maintenance or service delivery. Other work finds no relationship (Wilson and Buckler 2010) or even a positive association between unionization and reform (Morabito 2014) .
Many collective bargaining agreements provide significant procedural protections and rights of appeal to officers accused of misconduct. Using Chicago data, Iris (1998) finds that disciplinary orders are frequently overturned during arbitral review. Others argue that the special procedural rights afforded law enforcement officers make it unduly difficult to discipline them in the first place (Huq and McAdams 2016; Keenan and Walker 2005; Rushin 2017 (Kearney and Mareschal 2014; McCormick 2015; Piven 1973; Riccucci 1990; Walker 2008) .
Here, too, however, the empirical literature is small and conflicted. Mladenka (1991) finds that unionization is negatively correlated with black employment in protective service jobs, which include law enforcement as well as firefighting and corrections. Sass and Troyer (1999) conclude that the evidence of union effects on the hiring of female law enforcement officers is mixed. There is some evidence, they find, that unions boost the hiring of female officers, yet unions are also associated with adoption of fitness examinations to screen new recruits, a potential barrier for female applicants. Finally, Morabito and Shelley (2015) find that law enforcement unionization is positively correlated with female employment but uncorrelated with racial diversity.
3) Collective Bargaining Rights in Florida Law Enforcement Agencies
We begin with two general points of Florida law. First, Florida is a right-to-work state, meaning that employees cannot be compelled to join or pay dues to the union that represents and collectively bargains for their workforce (Fla. Const., Art. I, Sec. 6). Second, Florida provides by statute a Law Enforcement Officer Bill of Rights ("LEOBOR"), which includes a variety of procedural protections for officers facing disciplinary investigations. One provision gives such an officer the right to "be informed of the nature of the investigation before any interrogation begins,"
and to receive "all witness statements . . . and all other existing evidence, including, but not limited to, incident reports, GPS locator information, and audio or video recordings relating to the incident under investigation, . . . before the beginning of any investigative interview of that officer" (F.S.A. § 112.532(1)(d)). That is particularly generous given another requirement that "[a]ll identifiable witnesses shall be interviewed, whenever possible, prior to the beginning of the investigative interview of the accused officer" (id.).
This background ought to dull the effects of collective bargaining on law enforcement behavior. First, unions are generally weaker in right-to-work states than in non-right-to-work states. According to Putchinski (2007, p. 71), "[u] nions in Florida, including police unions, experience relatively lower membership rates with subsequent lower resources and funds as a result of existing right-to-work legislation." Second, Florida's statutory procedural protections leave less for unions to accomplish through collective bargaining, so bargaining might be expected to have only a weak effect on law enforcement behavior. As we discuss below, these are two of several reasons that our study is biased against finding effects from collective bargaining. Now we turn to the specific change in Florida labor law that is the basis for our quasi-experiment.
3.1) The Florida Supreme Court's Williams Decision of 2003
To Immediately after that, sheriffs' deputies began to organize for collective bargaining in substantial numbers. Doerner and Doerner (2010, p. 368) System (ATMS), to match officers to agencies. We thereby construct, for each year in our sample period (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) (2015) (2016) , variables for the total number of officers in an agency, the fraction of officers who are non-Hispanic Whites, and the fraction of officers who are male. We use these ATMS variables, rather than the corresponding variables reported in CJAP, in our analysis. However, for the years where they overlap, the ATMS-based variables are virtually identical to those in CJAP.
As foreshadowed in Section 3, our empirical strategy involves comparing SOs and PDs before and after the Williams decision. Pynes and Corley (2006, p. 299) highlight "the similarities in job duties" between sheriff deputies and police officers, which suggests that PDs are in general a good comparison group. Moreover, any differences in job duties that may exist are not likely to have changed at the time of the Williams decision. In one respect, however, SOs and PDs do differ.
Peace officers in Florida are generally certified in "law enforcement," "corrections," or both (known as "concurrent" certification). SOs employ a greater proportion of certified corrections officers than do PDs. Thus, we restrict our analysis to officers who are certified in law enforcement, either with or (more typically) without concurrent certification in corrections. 7 The total counts of officers that we use, as well as the race and gender variables and the complaints and disciplinary actions data, all exclude officers certified solely in corrections.
The ATMS database also records complaints against officers. These include complaints that are initiated or investigated by an officer's local agency (i.e., the employing SO or PD). If a local agency has cause to believe an officer has committed a felony or a misdemeanor involving dishonesty, or is not of "good moral character" (as defined by regulation), the agency must investigate. If the agency sustains the allegation, it must submit its findings to the FDLE, which triggers the FDLE's disciplinary process (F.S.A. § 943.13(4), (7); F.A.C. Rule 11B-27.0011).
However, the FDLE also has information channels that are independent of the local agencies -for instance, newspaper reports of officer misconduct.
The complaints dataset records for each complaint the source of the complaint, the officer, the officer's agency, the date on which the case was opened, and the disposition of the complaint.
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The most common source is investigations by local agencies. The complaint-source categories "Internal Investigation" and "Affidavit of Separation" both comprise complaints that originate with the local agency; the latter category is used when the officer's employment has been terminated. "Verifiable Complaints" include complaints from members of the public, while "Newspaper" includes incidents brought to the attention of the FDLE through media reports.
From this database, we extract information on the number of complaints and aggregate this to the agency-year level -for instance, we compute the number of complaints faced by officers employed at the Broward County SO in 2002. The majority of these observations are zeroes, indicating that the agency had no complaints of officer misconduct reported in the FDLE complaints database in that year. Over 1997-2016, about 38% of agency-year observations have a positive number of complaints.
As previously discussed, complaints are an imperfect measure of underlying police misconduct. Complaints are potentially affected by the strength of internal mechanisms for detection and by the propensity of civilians to report misconduct, as well as by the level of misconduct. As noted earlier, however, all of the complaints in the ATMS database meet a specified threshold of seriousness, and most were already sustained by a local agency. These statelevel complaints, therefore, may be a better proxy for misconduct than are agency-level complaints, including civilian complaints.
9
The FDLE has the power to impose additional sanctions on officers, beyond those imposed by the local agency. For each complaint in the database, we observe whether the FDLE imposed any disciplinary action. We extract information on the number of disciplinary actions, aggregated (at https://www.bjs.gov/ucrdata/abouttheucr.cfm). The UCR data also provides an estimate of the population of the area corresponding to the law enforcement agency's jurisdiction. This has somewhat less coverage than the county population data from the Census Bureau, but the results are robust to using the UCR measure rather than the Census Bureau measure of population. The descriptive statistics in Table 1 suggest a relative increase in complaints and in state disciplinary actions for the 58 SOs in our treatment group, when compared to PDs. It also suggests, albeit less clearly, the possibility of post-Williams increases for SOs in the fraction of non-Hispanic White officers, the fraction of male officers, the length of training required for new recruits with an FTO, the fraction of agencies imposing educational requirements beyond a high school degree, and the fraction of agencies issuing all officers weapons more powerful than a handgun (i.e., shotguns or rifles). These outcomes are all analyzed further in the regression analysis described below. to be located in areas with higher crime rates and with larger and more diverse populations.
However, these differences in characteristics do not appear to change substantially in the postWilliams period. Moreover, the regression analysis described below controls for changes in these variables.
A first step in the study is to verify that the treatment (i.e., the Williams decision) did indeed have an impact on the unionization status of SOs, as has been documented in the past (see, for example, Doerner and Doerner 2010) . Williams, complaints against officers at SOs seem to follow an upward trend, while those for PDs 11 There are, of course, additional reasons to expect that any effect would occur with some lag. For instance, Putchinski (2007, p. 46) notes that, "[a]s collective bargaining progresses over time, police unions tend to become more influential within the local host government." However, we use Figure 1 to choose a specific lag to use in our empirical specification.
remain quite stable. Most dramatically, there is a large increase in complaints about three years after Williams (corresponding to the period over which SOs transitioned to CBAs, as shown in Figure 1 ). This is partially reversed the following year, although the magnitude of the decline is substantially smaller than the prior year's increase. Thereafter, the upward trend resumes. Overall, the post-Williams period exhibits an upward trend for SOs, relative to PDs, even ignoring the 2006 spike.
Moreover, this increase in complaints among SOs appears most pronounced among SOs that adopted CBAs. incidents brought to the attention of the FDLE through media reports -declined. This suggests that the increased number of complaints is unlikely to result from greater zeal on the part of the FDLE. There was an increase in "Verifiable Complaints" (which include complaints from members of the public), consistent with an increase in underlying misconduct. The "Other" category also grew, but it is difficult to interpret the implications of this, as there is limited information about what this category includes.
Overall, the figures discussed above suggest that complaints increased for SOs after
Williams. Figure 5 plots the corresponding numbers for state disciplinary actions against officers.
Here, too, there is evidence of an increase in 2006, with disciplinary actions stabilizing at a higher level than previously existed. Moreover, in a manner analogous to the pattern in Figure 3 , the increase in disciplinary actions after 2003 is more pronounced among SOs with CBAs. However, the number of disciplinary actions for SOs exhibits substantially greater volatility than that for PDs prior to Williams. Thus, while there appears to be an upward trend following Williams for SOs relative to PDs, it is difficult to reach any firm conclusion. 
4.2) Empirical Strategy
As foreshadowed in Section 3, our empirical strategy involves comparing outcomes such as complaints for SOs and PDs before and after the Williams decision. This approach has a number of advantages over those in the existing literature. Prior studies of the impact of police unions use potentially endogenous unionization decisions (Anzia and Moe 2014) or changes in state law with respect to public sector unions (Frandsen 2014; Ichniowski, Freeman, and Lauer 1989) . The latter approach requires the assumption that state legislation is exogenous with respect to outcomes of interest. Our approach holds state-level factors constant by focusing on quasi-experimental variation across agencies in the same state. Pynes and Corley (2006, p. 299) highlight the "unusual history of collective bargaining" rights in Florida, but the Williams decision has not previously been used to construct a quasi-experimental framework. Doerner and Doerner (2010) refer to the case, but their empirical analysis uses only data on Florida SOs to examine wage and benefits outcomes for SOs that (potentially endogenously) choose to unionize after Williams. Doerner and Doerner (2013) extend their analysis to Florida PDs, but do not use PDs as a control group for SOs; the source of variation is again derived from potentially endogenous unionization decisions.
14 While we observe CBA status at the agency-year level in the CJAP data, a major concern with using this as our variable of interest is that the factors that lead officers in a given agency to unionize and form a collective bargaining unit may be correlated with the outcome variables (such as the number of complaints). For instance, officers who anticipate engaging in higher levels of misconduct in the future may form a union in order to obtain greater procedural safeguards against being disciplined. A regression of complaints on CBA status would then yield a coefficient that may be biased upwards, relative to the causal impact of CBA status on complaints. Our approach of using an exogenous conferral of collective bargaining rights to a subset of agencies avoids this potential bias. 15 It also allows us to analyze the impact of bargaining in the shadow of collective bargaining rights (irrespective of CBA status).
The main outcome variable (complaints) takes on only non-negative integer values, and thus is an example of "count" data. Moreover, it includes many zero observations, as noted above.
Although linear specifications are in general highly flexible and robust, there are a number of problems with a standard linear model in these circumstances. Due to the skewness of the data and the large number of zeroes, the normality of errors assumption is difficult to satisfy with any feasible transformation. It is thus common to use a specification that better accommodates count data, such as the Poisson maximum-likelihood model:
represents an outcome variable (such as the number of complaints) at agency i in year t.
is an indicator variable equal to one for the years (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) Bulman (2017) uses an empirical strategy that identifies the impact of the race of the sheriff on the racial composition of arrests, controlling for the race of police department chiefs in the same county. While his approach also compares SOs and PDs, the identification strategy and research question are very different from ours. 15 Note, however, that in our setting a "naïve" regression of the number of complaints on an indicator variable for the presence of a CBA yields a positive and significant coefficient on the CBA variable. The magnitude is fairly similar to our baseline difference-in-difference estimate. This suggests that this type of bias is not very large in our particular context. Even so, in the absence of a quasi-experiment such as Williams, it would be impossible to be confident of the credibility of a causal interpretation of this effect. 16 Note that includes 2003 because the decision was made in January of that year.
variable equal to one if agency i is part of the treatment group. The interaction term ( * ) , −3 is our variable of interest; as noted earlier, we use a 3-year lag to reflect the delayed response evident in Figure 1 . is the number of sworn officers (certified in law enforcement or concurrently certified in both law enforcement and corrections) employed at agency i in year t. is an agency fixed effect and is a year fixed effect, while is the error term.
is a vector of control variables, which fall into three categories. The first category captures the demographic characteristics of the county in which agency i is located. These include the size of the resident population, the fraction of the resident population aged 18-24, the fraction of the resident population that is Hispanic, and the fraction of the resident population that is African
American. Second, local economic conditions are captured by the county's unemployment rate.
The third category of controls is for crime rates, and includes the number of murders, property crimes, and violent crimes in agency i's jurisdiction in year t.
Crime rates are important controls as they indicate the extent and nature of law enforcement contacts with civilians. We include aggregate measures of property and violent crimes. As these may be mismeasured due to underreporting (and may indeed be influenced by the agency's policies and likelihood of solving crimes), we also include murders, which are generally thought to be measured with greater accuracy. The unemployment rate in part serves as a proxy for incentives to commit crime, but also provides a measure of officers' outside options in the local area (and hence the opportunity cost of misconduct). The demographic variables capture aspects of the characteristics of the local area that may affect the number of complaints and the various other outcome variables that we study. For instance, the fraction of the resident population aged 18-24 is often thought to be correlated with crime rates. The racial composition of the resident population is of particular importance when testing for effects of Williams on the racial diversity of agencies.
The Poisson model in Equation (1) has a number of potential limitations. The Poisson distribution assumes that the variance is equal to the mean, although it is somewhat robust to violations of this assumption. To address possible "over-dispersion" (where the variance exceeds the mean) in our data, we compute robust standard errors that are clustered at the agency level. We also use the alternative negative binomial model for count data. Unfortunately, the baseline specification (with agency fixed effects along with robust standard errors clustered at the agency level) cannot be precisely replicated in the negative binomial framework. However, using alternative negative binomial specifications that allow for robust standard errors leads to generally similar results.
A variant of the Poisson model, known as the zero-inflated Poisson (ZIP) specification, is designed to accommodate situations where the data includes a particularly large number of zeroes.
However, available implementations of the ZIP model do not allow for fixed effects, and thus we would be unable to control for unobserved heterogeneity across agencies. Moreover, the ZIP model requires an exclusion restriction -a variable that affects the probability of a zero observation, while not affecting the magnitude of nonzero observations -that is not readily available in our setting.
For other potential outcome variables such as the racial and gender composition of agencies and the length of FTO training, our baseline analysis uses a linear fixed-effects specification:
where is a relevant outcome variable and the other variables are as defined above in Equation
(1). For robustness checks, we add to Equation (2) linear agency-specific trends of the form ( * ) , where is an indicator variable equal to one for agency i and is the year. In other robustness checks, we add to Equation (2) county-by-year fixed effects of the form -i.e., an indicator variable for county c (which typically contains multiple agencies) in year t. Note also that, while the baseline analysis of complaints uses the Poisson specification in Equation (1), the results are very similar -and indeed stronger in some respects -when using the linear specification in Equation (2).
A key assumption of our difference-in-difference approach is that the treatment and control groups experience parallel trends in the period prior to the treatment. That is, it is important to establish that any estimated effect for complaints against SOs is not the result of a preexisting increasing trend in complaints for SOs, relative to PDs. We follow three different approaches to addressing this issue. The first is the visual inspection of the graph in Figure 2 , which does not suggest that SOs and PDs experienced different trends in complaints prior to Williams (see the discussion in Section 4.1 above). Second, we add to our regression specification (Equation (1)) a series of leads and lags of the variable of interest, in order to determine whether a differential "effect" for SOs is detectable in years prior to Williams (see the discussion in Section 5.1 below).
Finally, we add linear agency-specific time trends to our model (see the discussion in Section 5.2 below).
5) Results

5.1) Basic Results
The results from the specification in Equation (1) for the number of complaints is reported in Table 2 . The time period used is 1997-2010, in order to maintain approximate balance in the lengths of the pre-Williams and post-Williams periods, and to focus on the effects of Williams rather than those of the subsequent legal developments. 17 The first column includes agency and year fixed effects, but no controls apart from the number of officers (which is included in all specifications in order to scale the number of complaints by agency size). The variable of interest is the third lag of the interaction of a post-Williams dummy with a dummy for SOs. This has a positive coefficient that is statistically significant at the 5% level. This estimate is virtually identical in magnitude and significance when adding the extensive set of demographic, economic, and crime-rate controls described previously (Column 2).
As the Poisson specification takes an exponential form (see Equation (1)), the percentage impact of Williams on complaints is given by 100( 0.24 − 1), holding all other independent variables fixed. Thus, the estimated coefficient implies that collective bargaining rights lead to about a 27% increase in complaints of officer misconduct. As the mean number of complaints per year for SOs prior to Williams is a little over 2, this implies an increase of about 0.6 of a complaint for a typical SO (holding all other independent variables fixed). The implied magnitude is thus quite substantial.
In Column 3 of Table 2 , we add a series of leads and lags of the variable of interest, following an approach proposed by Autor (2003) . Figure 8 plots these leads and lags of the difference-in-difference estimate, with 95% confidence intervals also being shown. There are a number of reasons for undertaking this exercise. First, it enables us to verify the time pattern of the estimated effects, in particular whether the three-year lagged effect that we assumed in Columns 1 and 2 (based on the time pattern of SOs adopting CBAs in Figure 1 ) is borne out by this more flexible specification. Indeed, the results in Column 3 indicate that the effect is concentrated in the third year after Williams. As might be expected from Figure 2 , there is a partial reversal of this effect in the subsequent year; however, this is substantially smaller in magnitude than the prior year's increase, and is not statistically significant. Similarly, Figure 8 shows that the only statistically significant difference-in-difference effect is in 2006, with the other estimates being statistically insignificant and mostly close to zero.
The leads and lags in Column 3 also provide evidence for a causal interpretation of the estimated effect. In particular, there are no apparent differential effects for SOs relative to PDs for years prior to Williams. These estimates can be viewed as "false experiments" (or placebo tests)
showing the absence of any effects prior to the actual experiment (i.e. Williams). They imply that
SOs did not experience a preexisting upward trend in complaints that merely continued in the postWilliams period. Figure 2 does not suggest the existence of such a preexisting trend, and the results in Column 3 confirm this, thereby reinforcing a causal interpretation of our findings as an effect of the collective bargaining rights Williams conferred.
In Columns 1-3 of Table 2 , we include both zero and nonzero observations of the number of complaints (note, however, that the Poisson model omits any agency for which complaints are zero in all years). In Column 4, we restrict the analysis to nonzero observations only. The result is robust, and indeed larger in magnitude than in Column 2. Admittedly, excluding zeroes potentially creates bias in the estimates. However, the similarity of the findings with and without zeroes suggests that the basic results in the prior columns are not attributable to any bias associated with the presence of an excess number of zeroes in our data. Moreover, it implies that our finding holds along the "intensive" margin -i.e., SOs that were already experiencing complaints tended to experience more of them after Williams.
A potential alternative explanation for a post-Williams increase in complaints against SOs is that unionization may result in an increased degree of bureaucratization of the investigation process. This may entail that -rather than there being an increase in the level of actual misconduct -a larger number of less serious complaints end up being recorded. To address this point about the "quality" (or seriousness) of complaints, we examine the number of disciplinary actions by the state, conditional on the presence of complaints. Column 5 of Table 2 (like the previous column) restricts the sample to agency-years with a nonzero number of complaints, while the dependent variable is now the number of state disciplinary actions. The estimates imply an increase in the number of disciplinary actions following Williams, although this is only of borderline statistical significance.
The imposition of discipline by the state (in addition to penalties imposed at the local level)
can arguably be viewed as a proxy for complaints of greater seriousness. In principle, it is possible that the absence of state disciplinary action results not from the lack of severity of the infraction, but rather is due to the local agency imposing sufficiently strong sanctions. In such circumstances, the FDLE issues a Letter of Acknowledgement (LOA), acknowledging that the disciplinary action already taken by the agency is sufficient. However, under the FDLE's rules, an LOA cannot be issued in cases where the officer has faced discipline in the past eight years, when the officer has resigned, or when the penalty guideline for the misconduct specifies a penalty ranging from prospective suspension of certification to revocation (F.A.C. Rule 11B-27.005). As a result, most serious violations are subject to state disciplinary action, irrespective of the local agency's penalty.
Thus, the increase in disciplinary actions conditional on complaints in Column 5 of Table 2 suggests that the substantially higher number of complaints against SO officers in and after 2006
was not accompanied by a decline in the seriousness of these complaints. Column 1 of Table 3 reports a simple linear specification for the number of complaints (similar to Equation (2)), while Column 2 adds the standard set of control variables. In each case, the Williams effect on SOs is substantial and statistically significant. The magnitude implies that collective bargaining rights lead to about an additional 0.6 complaints per year (relative to a mean among SOs prior to Williams of a little over 2). This is very close to the magnitude estimated for a typical SO using the Poisson model (Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2 ). While caution must be exercised in interpreting a linear specification in view of the nature of our data, it is reassuring that the Poisson and linear models lead to very similar conclusions.
5.2) Robustness Checks
Column 3 of Table 3 adds linear agency-specific trends to the model. This does not affect the statistical significance of the result, relative to Columns 1 and 2. Indeed, the magnitude is larger, implying that collective bargaining rights lead to about one additional complaint per year.
The main implication here is that linear agency-specific trends do not undermine the basic result in a linear framework. This provides some indication that the baseline result using the Poisson model is unlikely to be driven by preexisting trends.
The specification we have used controls for a wide variety of demographic, economic, and crime-related variables. However, it is still possible that unobserved changes at the local level may affect the number of complaints. It is possible to take account of these by including county-byyear fixed effects of the form -i.e., an indicator variable for county c in year t. These countyby-year fixed effects can in principle be estimated even in the presence of agency and year fixed effects (and linear agency-specific trends), as each county typically includes multiple agencies.
However, as Florida has 67 counties, we need to include 938 county-by-year fixed effects over 1997-2010, and maximum-likelihood estimation for the Poisson model (Equation (1)) does not converge in these circumstances. Adding county-by-year fixed effects to the linear specification (Column 4 of Table 3 ), however, shows that the basic result remains robust. Note here that the demographic variables and unemployment are omitted because they are defined at the county-year level (and would thus be absorbed by county-by-year fixed effects); the crime variables are included because they are defined at the agency-year level, and so vary within a county-year cell.
The estimated magnitude again implies that collective bargaining rights lead to about one additional complaint per year.
As noted at various prior points in the paper, we conduct a number of other robustness checks that are not reported in the tables. For instance, the results are robust to using the UCR measure of city population, rather than the Census Bureau measure of county population. 
5.3) Other Outcome Variables and Tests
While our primary results relate to complaints, there are a number of other outcome variables that are potentially of interest in relation to ongoing scholarly and public debates about policing. We thus report in Table 4 the analysis of various other outcomes, although none of these results is robustly significant across specifications.
An important -and largely unresolved -issue in the literature on police unions is the impact of collective bargaining rights on racial and gender diversity in law enforcement agencies.
Indeed, Morabito and Shelley (2015, p. 338) notes that, "[t]hus far, the empirical relationship between diversity and unionization is unclear." The first two columns of Table 4 report results from running the linear specification in Equation (2) on a variable capturing the racial composition of agencies -the fraction of officers who report their race/ethnicity as non-Hispanic White.
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Column 1 finds what appears to be a substantial and statistically significant increase in the fraction of officers who are non-Hispanic Whites at SOs, relative to PDs, after Williams. However, adding the control variables (Column 2) leads to a smaller and statistically insignificant effect. In particular, it appears that the control variable for the Hispanic fraction of the resident population -which is highly significant in Column 2 -substantially absorbs the apparent Williams effect. We also test for any impact on the fraction of African American officers, but the estimated impact of
Williams is small and statistically insignificant.
Thus, any effect of Williams on the racial composition of law enforcement agencies is not robustly significant across specifications. It should be remembered, however, that there is limited variation in the racial composition of agencies, as illustrated in Figure 6 . Similarly, as shown in Figure 7 , there is very limited variation over our sample period in the fraction of male officers for either SOs or PDs (and the (unreported) difference-in-difference estimate of the effect of Williams on the fraction of male officers is very close to zero and is statistically insignificant). The limited 18 This fraction is computed as the number of officers in an agency-year reporting that they are non-Hispanic White divided by the total number of officers employed (excluding those officers with a missing value for the race variable in the ATMS database). In each case, only law enforcement and concurrently certified officers are included (with corrections officers being excluded). The results are similar when dividing by the total number of officers employed (including those officers with a missing value for the race variable in the ATMS database).
variation makes it difficult to detect any impact that collective bargaining rights may have on racial and gender diversity.
Column 3 of Table 4 reports results on the length of the FTO training period. The difference-in-difference estimate implies that collective bargaining rights increase the training period by about 6 days (relative to a mean of about 10 weeks for SOs in 2002). However, the estimate is of only borderline statistical significance. Column 4 of Table 4 reports a conditional fixed effects logit model for a binary variable equal to one if the minimum education requirement exceeds a high school diploma. The logit model omits agencies that do not change their minimum education requirement during our sample period, accounting for the small sample size. The estimate implies an increase in the probability of higher minimum education requirements. This is also the case when using a linear model, but the estimate is of only borderline statistical significance.
Taken together, the results on training and education are not robustly significant across specifications. To the extent that there is any positive impact of collective bargaining rights on these requirements, this may be another factor creating a bias against our basic finding on complaints. In particular, it might be expected that better-trained and better-educated officers Lersch and Kunzman (2001) .) 19 However, firm conclusions are difficult to reach because the estimates are not robustly significant. 20 We described in Section 3.2 above the legal developments with respect to the "legislative body" question that lingered subsequent to the Williams decision. To the extent that the definition of the legislative body matters for outcomes such as police misconduct, it is possible that the resolution of legal uncertainty about this issue (which occurred around 2010 or 2011) may generate additional effects. We test for any such effects by running a difference-in-difference model analogous to Equations (1) and (2), with the variable of interest being an interaction between an indicator for post-2010 years and an indicator for SOs. This is run over the sample period 2004- 19 An alternative hypothesis, in line with our results, is that bad training causes bad behavior (Getty, Worrall, and Morris 2016) . If most of the new increment of training were of the wrong kind, it could make police behavior worse. It is also possible that heightened minimum education requirements reduce the pool of eligible officer candidates who otherwise present a low risk of misconduct. 20 Estimates of the impact of Williams on the types of firearms issued to officers (not reported here) are small and statistically insignificant.
2016, to focus on the post-Williams period. These tests do not reveal any additional effect on the number of complaints: the interaction term of interest is small and statistically insignificant. This suggests that the impact of Williams has largely been captured by our earlier results (in Tables 2   and 3 ).
6) Discussion and Conclusion
The determinants of law enforcement misconduct have become a question of wide interest to scholars, policymakers, and the public. We provide what we believe to be the first quasiexperimental evidence on the impact of collective bargaining rights on misconduct by law enforcement officers. Using the Florida Supreme Court's Williams decision of 2003, we show that the conferral of collective bargaining rights on officers at SOs led to an increase in complaints of misconduct, relative to a control group of PDs that were unaffected by Williams.
While some of these points have been raised earlier, it is worth reiterating that there are several sources of potential bias against this finding. First, Florida is a right-to-work state, which limits the ability of employees to organize effectively. Second, Florida has a statutory LEOBOR that applies to all law enforcement officers, leaving less for collective bargaining to accomplish.
Relatedly, the existence of a state-level FDLE disciplining mechanism leaves less room for collective bargaining to reduce the expected sanctions for misconduct. Our result may be attributable to those CBA provisions that exceed the LEOBOR in extending procedural protections to officers (we give examples below).
Third, throughout the post-treatment observation period, sheriffs continued to claim the authority, as the pertinent "legislative body," to resolve any bargaining impasse, creating uncertainty about the strength of the Williams right (although we do not find any detectable additional effect of the resolution of uncertainty about this question). Fourth, our measure of complaints consists mostly of misconduct claims that have been sustained by the local agency. To the extent that unionized agencies are less likely to sustain complaints (because of the strong procedural protections they afford), it is possible that fewer complaints will be initiated. Even if the same number of complaints are initiated, the number of sustained complaints reported to the FDLE would fall. These potential effects would create a bias against our finding.
Finally, we noted earlier that the duties of sheriff deputies and police officers are quite similar, and that the agencies draw upon similar pools of applicants. If the labor market for SO and Oct. 1, 2013 -Sept. 30, 2016 : "No employee shall serve a suspension without pay until an Arbitrator or the Personnel Board has rendered a decision, whichever procedure is applicable."). 22 See, e.g., Agreement Between Fraternal Order of Police, Coral Gables Lodge #7 and The City of Coral Gables (Oct. 1, 2013 -Sept. 30, 2016 ) (Art. 10(n): "No records will be saved, for any reason, beyond three years from the date that they were first eligible for destruction with the exception of noticed litigation.") Agreement Between City of Hialeah, Fla. and Dade County Police Benevolent Ass'n (Oct. 1, 2013 -Sept. 30, 2016) (Art. 25, sec. 2(o) : "Any internal investigation, except where criminal charges are being investigated, shall be completed within sixty (60) days from the date the officer is informed of the initial complaint. No officer may be subjected to any disciplinary action as a result of any investigation not completed within that time period.").
found in these CBAs that provide procedural protections for officers that go beyond those in Florida's LEOBOR.
There are also some possible channels that would not be found in the CBAs. For instance, it is possible that certain LEOBOR rights may be partly ignored by some sheriffs before there is collective bargaining but not afterwards. It is also possible that collective bargaining increases the group cohesion of officers and strengthens pro-worker norms, perhaps including the code of silence that reduces the probability of the detection of misconduct. Agencies may also be more reluctant to take actions that alienate officers (independently of specific CBA provisions) when officers have greater bargaining power. Our ongoing work seeks to distinguish among these and other potential channels to the extent possible with the available data. and were sustained by the local agency (with the officer's employment being terminated in the latter category but not in the former). "Verifiable Complaints" include complaints from members of the public; "Newspaper" includes incidents brought to the attention of the FDLE through media reports. [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] and the post-Williams period. There are up to 308 PDs with the required data (although the number is smaller for some variables). The variables are defined as described in the notes to Panel A. The primary variable of interest is the third lag of the interaction between a post-Williams indicator (for years beginning in 2003) and an indicator for SOs; this is the variable (Post*SO)t-3 (which denotes the third lag). All other variables are as defined in Table 1 . Robust standard errors clustered at the agency level are in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. (Columns 1-2 ) at the agency-year level. Column 3 reports regression results for the Field Training Officer (FTO) training period. Column 4 reports a conditional fixed-effects logit specification for an indicator capturing minimum educational requirements (specifically, a dummy for whether education beyond a high school diploma is required). The primary variable of interest is the third lag of the interaction between a post-Williams indicator (for years beginning in 2003) and an indicator for SOs; this is the variable (Post*SO)t-3 (which denotes the third lag). All other variables are as defined in Table 1 . Robust standard errors clustered at the agency level are in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
